ECONOMICS
06-10-2026 by Freddie del Curatolo
In Kenya, even start-ups – the pride and hope of a country that is growing and would like to join the elite of the global economy – are at risk of going hungry.
It is one of the most glaring contradictions of the so-called Silicon Savannah: millions of dollars pour in from America and Europe, platforms are built, engineers are hired, press releases are issued about Africa’s digital revolution and, a few years later, someone has to explain to the liquidator where the money has gone. And we’re not talking small change.
Five hundred million dollars. That is the figure needed to turn a success story into the most uncomfortable question facing Kenya’s tech ecosystem. It is the amount raised by some of the start-ups that have closed down in recent years. A few names? Twiga Foods, Copia, Gro Intelligence, Koko Networks, Mobius Motors, MarketForce: different names, different sectors, but a surprisingly similar outcome.
The full list of major failed start-ups published by the Star far exceeds that figure: Twiga Foods had raised $185.4 million, Copia $123 million, Gro Intelligence $117.7 million, Koko Networks $100 million. Then there’s Mobius with $56 million, MarketForce with $42.5 million, WeFarm with $32 million, Sendy with $24.7 million, and others besides.
The overall figure is even more staggering. According to Business Daily, thirteen Kenyan companies that went out of business over the last five years had raised over 93 billion shillings, approximately 717 million dollars. Thousands of jobs were lost along with investors’ capital.
Yet something does not add up.
Because, during the same period, Kenya continued to be Africa’s champion at attracting venture capital. In 2025, Kenyan start-ups raised $984 million, nearly 127 billion shillings: the highest figure on the continent and a sharp increase from the 638 million raised in 2024.
So it is not money that is lacking.
Perhaps it is the very way in which it is used.
On closer inspection, Silicon Savannah resembles a giant greenhouse for start-ups: plenty of light, plenty of water, financial fertilisers, and foreign investors arriving with smiles and cheques with six zeros. The seedlings grow rapidly. Some become enormous. Then comes the moment when you have to take them out of the pot, plant them in the ground and see if they really have roots.
Take Mobius, perhaps the most symbolic case.
The idea was brilliant, and at the time we even promoted it: to build a car in Kenya designed for Africa – robust, simple, capable of tackling difficult roads and affordable for businesses operating in the most remote areas. Mobius was founded in 2011 and had raised $56 million across five funding rounds. It had attracted major investors and represented something that went beyond a normal start-up: the possibility that Kenya might finally produce its own car.
Then came the market.
A market where a second-hand car imported from Japan or the UK could cost less, offer a well-known brand, a network of spare parts and, in the eyes of many buyers, a more reassuring resale value.
Mobius did not fail because the idea was a bad one. It failed because a clever idea is not enough to override the realities of the real economy.
In August 2024, the company went into voluntary liquidation. Weighing heavily on the company were debt, financial problems and also a tax dispute with the Kenya Revenue Authority. But the fundamental problem remained that of an industrial company needing capital to produce cars and a market large and profitable enough to buy them.
It is a lesson worth far more than the 56 million lost.
Sometimes the market, unlike the millions of young people in this country, does not need to be guided or informed. It has already made up its mind.
Copia had identified a real problem: millions of people in rural and peri-urban areas lacked access to modern distribution of consumer goods. The company had built a vast network of agents, shops, warehouses and delivery services.
It worked.
But working does not necessarily mean making a profit.
Copia raised $123 million, building a network of over 50,000 agents and employing around 1,800 staff. In May 2024, it went into administration after failing to secure further funding. In September 2026, the High Court ordered its liquidation. Its realisable assets amounted to approximately 206.6 million schillings, whilst its liabilities were far greater.
The picture is almost cruel: a company that had raised the equivalent of over 15 billion schillings and which, in the end, was unable to financially sustain the organisation it had built with that money.
The problem, according to analyses of the case, was not necessarily the idea of bringing digital commerce to rural areas. It was the cost of the ‘last mile’, combined with very low margins and average order sizes that were too small to sustain such a cumbersome structure.
In other words: Copia had built a large company before proving that every part of that large company was economically viable.
This is probably where one of the deepest problems in start-up culture lies.
For years, Silicon Valley and Silicon Savannah have spoken the same language: scale, scale, scale. Grow rapidly. Win over users. Enter new markets. Recruit talent. Increase valuation. Raise the next round of funding.
Profit could wait.
As long as someone kept financing the wait.
MarketForce is another example. The company had grown to more than 800 employees, served 270,000 small retailers and raised $42.5 million through RejaReja, a platform that allowed the owners of thousands of small Kenyan shops, the ‘duka’, to order consumer goods directly and have them delivered. A simple and seemingly perfect idea for a country where distribution is still highly fragmented. The problem was that each delivery yielded very slim margins, whilst the logistics infrastructure required to reach thousands of small shops was very costly.
But its business model proved difficult to sustain: very slim margins, a price war, aggressive expansion and a highly capital-intensive model. Co-founder Tesh Mbaabu himself explained that the business had become unsustainable.
It is the paradox of funded growth: the more you grow, the more money you need. And if you lose money whilst growing, growth can simply become the quickest way to reach the point where the money runs out.
There is also another factor that Kenya should look at without hesitation: a considerable part of the ecosystem depends on foreign capital.
As long as the investment world is euphoric, the tap remains open. When interest rates, investors’ priorities or geopolitical conditions change, a company that seemed to have ten years of growth ahead of it suddenly finds itself desperately seeking the next round of funding.
Copia is a clear example: it was not necessarily a lack of customers that sealed its fate, but the inability to secure new capital on acceptable terms.
Mobius describes a similar situation from the industrial perspective: shareholders failed to provide fresh capital and the search for new investors proved unsuccessful.
This is a fundamental difference.
A healthy business should be able to weather a difficult period even if the investment world decides, for a few months or a few years, to look elsewhere.
A start-up built to survive on one funding round after another, however, can become dependent on the next cheque.
And so funding is no longer the company’s fuel.
It is its oxygen.
Koko Networks reveals another vulnerability. The company, which had raised around $100 million, had built over 3,000 ethanol distribution points and reached more than one and a half million households with a solution for clean cooking. Then the business model ran into trouble, partly due to the inability to secure crucial authorisations relating to imports and the monetisation of carbon credits.
The lesson here is different: it is not enough to have a good product, a large market and an investor.
You also need an environment in which the rules are predictable enough to allow a business to make five- or ten-year plans.
And this applies to Kenya far more than to any single start-up.
If the country truly wants to become an African technology powerhouse, it cannot ask its businesses to be innovative whilst at the same time forcing them to navigate a sea of taxes, permits, regulatory interpretations and sudden changes.
It would, however, be wrong to turn this story into an indictment of venture capital and foreign investors.
Without that money, many of the companies mentioned would never have existed.
And without venture capital, Kenya would probably not have built, in such a short space of time, a tech ecosystem capable of attracting nearly a billion dollars in a single year.
The problem, therefore, is not the money.
It is the quality of the investment.
According to analysts quoted by Business Daily, recurring causes of failure include burning through cash too quickly, poor financial discipline and business models unable to translate growth into sustainable operations.
Perhaps Kenya should start celebrating the number of years spent without having to raise further funds a little more, and the number of millions raised a little less.
It should focus less on a start-up’s valuation and more on its profit margin.
Less on the number of users and more on how many of those users actually pay.
Less on the speed with which a company expands into five African countries and more on its ability to survive decently in the first one.
And above all, it should learn to view failure not as a disgrace, but as a fact.
A start-up that fails after raising a million dollars can be a lesson.
One that fails after raising a hundred million should be a lesson for an entire industry.
Kenya does not need to become any less ambitious.
It needs, perhaps, to become more patient.
The flights of fancy, the daydreams, the unbridled optimism, the ‘we’ll be the best in the world’ – it’s almost endearing – but those who delve deeper find it increasingly difficult to distinguish between the good faith of the naive start-up founder and the opportunism of the funding-hunter.
The talent is there. The engineers are there. The entrepreneurs are there. The African market is huge, and many of the solutions the continent needs will not come from London, San Francisco or Berlin, but from Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu and Eldoret.
Kenya has shown it can attract the money needed to invent the future.
Now it must prove it can turn that money into companies capable of surviving the day the money stops coming in.
Perhaps the next generation of start-ups should begin with a question far less glamorous than ‘How much can we grow?’.
An almost old-fashioned question, more in keeping with an African workshop than with Silicon Valley: how much do we earn by selling this thing, and how much does it cost us to produce it?
It is not a visionary question; it is a fairly practical one.
And that is precisely why it could save the Silicon Savannah.
Because perhaps analysts and financiers have got it all wrong. Perhaps it was not the Silicon Savannah that was being built, but a gigantic greenhouse for start-ups: plenty of light, plenty of water, financial fertilisers, foreign investors arriving with smiles and six-figure cheques.
The seedlings grow rapidly.
Some become enormous.
Then comes the moment when you have to take them out of the pot, plant them in the ground and see if they really have roots.
And the future of Kenya’s tech sector, perhaps, will depend precisely on this: not on how many seedlings it can still grow, but on how many will be strong enough to survive when no one comes to water them any more.
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